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U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the
Afghanistan Campaign
Abstract
This article examines the U.S. response to global terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan
from 2001 to today. The aim of this article is first to understand the fallacies, missteps, and
misunderstandings of the U.S. approach in Afghanistan. Second, the analysis evaluates the
lessons learnt and some possible strategies for achieving long-term stability and security in
Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis focuses on the different strategies adopted by the
United States and their achievements. Despite a first victory over the Taliban regime, the
initial approach was focused on the enemy only and it lacked long-term planning, paving
the way to an insurgent movement against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Then, in 2003
the U.S. strategy started to focus on the population, government institutions, and local
support. This shift involved a significant change in tactics and operations and achieved
positive results from 2003 to 2005. However, since 2005 the situation has deteriorated,
casualties have increased and both the Taliban and al-Qaida have gathered strength.
Despite the injection of new troops, the U.S. and coalition forces have not find a way to
stabilize the country yet. The defeat of al-Qaida and the stability of Afghanistan are,
therefore, far from being achieved.
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U.S. Response to Terrorism: A
Strategic Analysis of the
Afghanistan Campaign
By Valentina Taddeo

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not to fear the
result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither
the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 1963

Introduction
When the United States declared war against terror on October 7, 2001,
they labelled as "terrorism" a universal enemy against whom all the civilized nations would have fought. The principal objective of the U.S. intervention was al-Qaida, and its bases in Afghanistan, protected by the
Taliban regime, were the target of U.S. air strikes. Since then, the U.S.
campaign in Afghanistan has adopted different strategies, from a counterterrorist approach focused on the enemy to a counterinsurgency approach
focused on the population.1 However, after eight years of confrontation
and seven years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, al-Qaida is far
from being defeated. The Taliban still have a strong influence, terrorism is
a daily threat, and Afghanistan is neither stable nor secure. During these
eight years, the U.S. strategy has tried to adapt itself to a changing threat
scenario. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan has made some progress
but it has failed to understand the problems that the intervention itself
has generated and to counter the threat with a proper strategy.
This article examines the U.S. response to global terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to today. The aim of this article is first to
understand the fallacies, missteps, and misunderstandings of the U.S.
approach in Afghanistan. Second, the analysis evaluates the lessons learnt
and some possible strategies for achieving long-term stability and security
in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis focuses on the different strategies adopted by the United States and their achievements. Despite a first
victory over the Taliban regime, the initial approach was focused on the
enemy only and it lacked long-term planning, paving the way to an insur27
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gent movement against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Then, in 2003
the U.S. strategy started to focus on the population, government institutions, and local support. This shift involved a significant change in tactics
and operations and achieved positive results from 2003 to 2005. However, since 2005 the situation has deteriorated, casualties have increased
and both the Taliban and al-Qaida have gathered strength. Despite the
injection of new troops, the U.S. and coalition forces have not find a way
to stabilize the country yet. The defeat of al-Qaida and the stability of
Afghanistan are, therefore, far from being achieved.

Global Terrorism: Al-Qaida
The first problem when dealing with terrorism is how to best define what
it is and how it is perceived. Many scholars describe terrorism as the "sustained use, or threat of use, of violence by a small group for political purposes such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political
grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response."2
According to this definition, the 9/11 attacks against the United States can
be labelled as acts of terrorism. However, the attacks on the United States
revealed a different facet of terrorism. It is no longer a small group acting
to attract attention, but an international network of affiliated extremist
groups whose principal object is to inflict mass casualties.3 Al-Qaida seeks
to overthrow the current world order, characterised by the primacy of the
United States. Therefore, al-Qaida is best understood as an "extremely
large-scale, transnational globalised insurgency rather than as a traditional terrorism problem."4 The difference between terrorist groups and
insurgents lies in their different objectives: while the first uses violence to
draw attention, the second aims at "overthrowing the political order
within a given territory, using a combination of subversion, terrorism,
guerrilla warfare, and propaganda."5
In his speech soon after 9/11, the U.S. President George W. Bush condemned al-Qaida for the attacks and called upon the Taliban to deliver all
the leaders of al-Qaida hidden in Afghanistan, as this was the movement's
main base. The United States then declared War on Terror arguing that
terrorism was a common enemy to all civilized nations.6 This claim was
intended to raise support from all the Western countries and to launch a
global crusade against all terrorist movements linked to al-Qaida. It was
also aimed at obtaining the United Nation's approval and support for the
intervention. However, a war against global terrorism that "will not end
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated"7 is unlikely to be achieved, since there will always be a certain
degree of terrorism in the world. Take for example crime, which can be
28
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decreased by strong policing but not completely eliminated; so also terrorism can be subdued but not completely defeated.8 The first aim of the
War on Terror was, thus, far from being reached even with an effective
military campaign. Nevertheless, strikes against al-Qaida training camps
and military installations of the Taliban regime began on October 7, 2001
as the Taliban refused to collaborate with the United States.9

U.S. Strategy Against Terrorism: The Case of
Afghanistan
The new terrorist threat against the United States called for new tactics
and strategies to achieve key objectives including: "the disruption of the
use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and the attack to the
military capability of the Taliban regime."10 An effective and comprehensive counterterrorist strategy to counter al-Qaida and the Taliban regime
was built by combining military action, law enforcement, the freezing of
financial assets and repeated drives for international cooperation.11 The
use of tactical aircraft armed with new generation weapons gave the
United States a consistent and immediate advantage in the battlefield.12
Moreover, the U.S. military made its commitment visible through the
deployment of Special Operation Forces to gain support from the antiTaliban Northern Alliance.13 The Taliban resistance collapsed almost
immediately; the initial campaign lasted less than two months and,
thanks to the coalition with the Northern Alliance, compelled Taliban and
al-Qaida members to shelter in the mountains in the eastern regions of
Afghanistan.
The strategy applied by the U.S. military, a network-centric combined
with an enemy-centric approach, resulted in a short-term victory only.
The network-centric warfare was focused on attacking a handful of key
targets such as communication lines or Taliban's training bases, but this
was not enough to secure long-lasting success.14 The enemy-centric warfare drew attention to the enemy ignoring the population, the process of
institution-building, infrastructures, and services for the local communities.15 Until 2003, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan lacked a populationcentric warfare aimed at eradicating the social support for al-Qaida and
the Taliban, building a strong and reliable government, and guaranteeing
security to the population. In fact, despite the fact that the Northern Alliance had established a new government in Kabul in June 2002, the
majority of the population, especially the Pashtuns, felt excluded from the
executive.16 As a consequence, the Taliban canvassed support from the
Pashtuns and began to move back into Afghanistan. With the institution
of an elected government, the Bush administration shifted its attention to
29
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Iraq, confident in the stabilizing role that the new Afghan National Army
(ANA) would have played in maintaining stability and order. However,
this shift proved to be fatal as "the war in Iraq drew attention and
resources before the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan had
been properly developed."17
The lack of long-term planning had significant consequences on the
resurgence of the Taliban. By May 2003, it had become evident that a
resurgence of activity against the government and the U.S.-led coalition
was operating not only in the eastern but also in the southern regions of
Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy lacked a counterinsurgency approach and
until 2003 did not do anything to counter the resurgence of the Taliban
and al-Qaida. Instead of a nation-building approach, the United States
focused only on gaining tactical victories on the ground, resorting to raids
and deploying a small number of troops. The result was a separation of
the coalition forces from the Afghan people. The major mistake was the
misunderstanding of the causes of local insurgencies. They were motivated not by ideology but by the lack of security and economic stability,
tribal rivalries, coercion, and the perception of a corrupt government
unable to exercise authority and to provide security.18
A change in the U.S. strategy finally began to take shape in late 2003 as a
consequence of the increased resurgence of Taliban attacks on the U.S.
military. The new approach was based on counterinsurgency operations
to erode the Taliban's popular support and growing strength, which
became the driving tactic in Afghanistan. The core principle animating
the new strategy was the identification of the Afghan people as the center
of gravity in the counterinsurgency.19 The main objective was
maintaining popular support in order to prevent local insurgencies and
coalitions forming with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Therefore, the number
of U.S. ground forces was increased, as were the number of experts on
Afghan culture and tradition. These experts and military forces were
primarily engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, in building
relations with the local population, and in strengthening confidence in the
Afghan Government.
The population-centered counterinsurgency approach also impacted military operations. The number of air strikes based on technical intelligence
decreased to avoid local unrest. The casualties among the population
caused by air strikes were, in fact, one of the principal reasons for local
protests against U.S. forces. Conversely, the increased engagement of
troops on the ground helped engender support for the objectives of coali-
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tion forces. This shift in strategy resulted in a more stable operating environment and increased local support both for the Afghan Government
and the coalition forces.

Local Support Wanes: A Renewed Emphasis on
NATO
However, all the achievements made up through 2005 began to fade away
in a few months. As Lieutenant General David Barno highlighted, "Since
2006 the Taliban and al-Qaida gathered strength, changed tactics, and
increased their capabilities and attacks especially across the border in
Pakistan."20 This step backwards was a reflection of the U.S. announcement to withdraw 2500 combat troops and shift responsibility for military
operations to NATO. This decision was perceived as the first signal of a
U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan. Moreover, the Karzai Government
and the ANA were not ready to provide security in many villages of the
country. The United States' willingness to withdraw troops, together with
the unpopularity of the government, created a vacuum that was quickly
filled by insurgent groups. The Taliban's aim was to eliminate the government's contact with the population, thereby discrediting the capacity of
the ANA to provide order and security. By forcing the United States to
take charge of local security, the Taliban portrayed the United States as a
belligerent occupying force that sought to control and manipulate the
Afghan Government.
The Taliban have since gained control of many villages in the Southern
and Eastern provinces, but their presence is also strong in cities like Kandahar and Ghazni. In these places, coalition forces are operating without
the support of the local population and are facing many difficulties in
maintaining stability and order. The situation is worsening in the regions
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where al-Qaida and the Taliban
continue to maintain a strong presence. This region is barely controlled
by the Pakistani Government, and U.S. forces are running into many difficulties along the border. As a result, despite some efforts the stability and
security of the borders are deteriorating.21

U.S. Policy in Afghanistan Under President Obama
Under the Obama Presidency, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has
undergone another change. In February 2009, President Obama
launched a new approach based on what seem to be attainable goals that
will hopefully be matched with adequate resources.22 The end game is to:
31
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"disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies,"23
although the U.S. commitment is primarily focused on protecting the
Afghans, not to kill the Taliban among them. The new counterinsurgency
strategy is aimed at pursuing judicial reforms, building good governance
and a reliable police, and protecting civilians through a patrolling
contingent in villages and towns to stop insurgents from intimidating and
recruiting locals. General Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. and NATO
forces' Commander in Afghanistan, has called for a limited use of air
strikes and for troops to be stationed and integrated with the locals. The
nation-building approach and the commitment of more troops on the
ground are aimed at countering the insurgency, while military operations
are to be conducted in the border regions with Pakistan to defeat al-Qaida
and the Taliban. As President Obama said, "This is not a war of choice,
this is a war of necessity."24
President Obama proposed sending more troops not only to prevent alQaida from re-establishing safe havens in Afghanistan, but also to prevent
the country from collapsing and becoming the terrain of tribal fights.25
On December 2, 2009, President Obama called for an infusion of 30,000
troops within six months. Many of the troops will operate as trainers for
the Afghan forces as a means to preserve stability and security once the
U.S. troops leave. This increase in troops reflects a willingness to end a
period of losses and stalemate, and to gradually shift the responsibility for
the security of the country to the Afghan military. Ultimately, however,
more U.S. troops in Afghanistan will be not enough to reverse the collapse
of security in the country.
In the more recent "Afghanistan Conference" in London, the NATO coalition and the Afghan Government proposed a "reintegration strategy,"
aimed at reintegrating the Taliban and the insurgents into the government and civil society through offers of money. However, questions arise
about whether the insurgents will be motivated to reintegrate. For the
time being, every proposal and negotiation has thus far been rejected by
the Taliban, whose only condition is the withdrawal of the foreign
troops.26 Whether this strategy will prove effective is a matter of time:
"counterinsurgency campaigns usually take many years, cost a fortune in
blood and treasure, and end in failure."27

Lessons Learned
After eight years in Afghanistan, the U.S. troops and their allies have
achieved neither stability nor security. Despite the prompt defeat of the
Taliban regime in 2001, the local population felt alienated from the new
32
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Afghan Government, which was perceived as corrupt and weak. Strategies
applied by U.S. troops did not always yield positive results. In particular,
the lack of a prompt and effective counterinsurgency campaign, the extensive use of air strikes, and the lack of contact with the local population
nullified most military efforts and achievements. Many lessons can be
learnt from the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and many changes should
be implemented to attain the initial objectives.
First, in order to prevent al-Qaida from re-establishing safe havens in
Afghanistan, it is necessary to stabilize the country. Stability, however, is
closely linked to a strong, reliable, and efficient government, a crucial element that Afghanistan still lacks. Moreover, the ANA is still not able to
provide security by itself and it, therefore, relies on foreign militaries for
maintaining order and delivering services to the population. However, the
longer U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, the more concerned the local
population will likely remain, since the U.S. presence is perceived as a
source of instability and as a threat to civilians.
The lack of understanding of Afghan culture, traditions, and institutions
negatively influenced the attempts to build a strong government. "A
strong central government has not been part of the history of Afghanistan"28 since tribes and clans were run by the tribal elders and local institutions. A possible alternative could be the establishment of a decisional
body with representatives elected by villages and ethnic groups. The
chance to be represented fairly by trusted members of different minorities
could reassure local populations and make them feel more secure and
willing to collaborate with the government. The Taliban were supported
by the locals not because of ideology, but because they were strong
enough to exert a coercive power that the official government lacked.
Therefore, reforms in the government to counter corruption and incompetence are necessary to build a valid alternative to the Taliban regime.
Second, the U.S. intervention should be primarily focused on maintaining
the achievements through a commitment to the local population. Until
now, the extensive use of air strikes and drones to carry out offensive
attacks has resulted in heavy civilian casualties, raising suspicion and
anger among many Afghans.29 The air strikes result in zero casualties
among U.S. troops, but they are almost useless in the process of pacifying
the country since they do not guarantee security on the ground once the
strikes end. As Gen. McChrystal has said, "under the new strategy the air
strikes should be used only if NATO troops were in danger of being overwhelmed." The problem lies in establishing when troops would be considered in such danger.
33
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A possible alternative could be training the ANA together with U.S. troops
in order to build confidence and support from the local military. The
Afghan army and police should become strong enough and trusted by
Afghans in order to replace foreign troops and enable their withdrawal in
the near future. Moreover, while it is undeniable that several civilian
casualties were caused by air strikes, it is also true that many resulted
from suicide attacks perpetrated by the terrorists. Raising awareness
among the population of the threat posed by these suicide bombers could
shift the resentment from U.S. troops and coalition forces to the terrorist
cells. The commitment of more troops in villages and cities should not
result in isolation of troops from the local population.
The military should be trained on how to communicate effectively with
locals and how to be part of the community and, therefore, be accepted as
a friendly presence. This strategy, however, requires time, adequate
forces, and resources. The infusion of 30,000 troops recently announced
by President Obama seems to be aimed mainly at training Afghan forces
in order to facilitate a U.S. withdrawal in the near future. However, this
declaration could be counterproductive as it might undermine local support for U.S. forces, perceived as transitory and not reliable in the future
of Afghanistan.
Third, the lack of collaboration between the United States and countries
bordering Afghanistan has hampered U.S. efforts to stabilize the country.
The unwillingness of the Bush Administration to revaluate its strategic
priorities in the region after the overthrow of the Taliban caused stagnation in negotiations for a comprehensive multilateral approach to Afghanistan.30 The prospects for stability largely depend on collaboration with
Pakistan over the Taliban's bases along the border with Afghanistan,
along with other players in the region. The geography of Afghanistan
makes the country the center of gravity of the region. Unless the United
States actively involves other regional players in the stabilization of
Afghanistan, no long-term objectives will be achieved. A possible solution
could be reopening the dialogue with Iran and reconsidering the role of
Pakistan for a peace settlement with the Taliban. Al-Qaida and the Taliban receive arms, and recruit and train people especially from Pakistan. A
firmer U.S. stance toward Pakistan is needed to stop support to terrorists,
which may produce more results than even a military campaign.

Conclusion
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has adopted different approaches since
2001: From counterterrorism to counterinsurgency; from enemy-centric
34

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.2.3

Taddeo: U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanist

U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign

to population-centric warfare; and, finally, from extensive use of air
strikes to a commitment of more troops on the ground. Despite some initial achievements, the situation in Afghanistan is still complicated and far
from being solved. The lack of a trusted government, opposition of the
local population to foreign troops, regional interests and lack of collaboration among neighbouring countries almost nullified the military results in
overthrowing the Taliban and marginalizing al-Qaida. The change in the
U.S. administration called for a new strategy, focused on nation-building,
popular support, and long-term stability. It reflects a shift toward a counterinsurgency approach that could achieve more positive results than a
conventional military campaign. However, it might take many years to
stabilize and secure Afghanistan in order to prevent al-Qaida and the Taliban from gaining ground. As Larry Goodson from the U.S. Army War
College has said, "Time is running out in Afghanistan."31
For American policy in Afghanistan to have any hope of success, it is
necessary to learn from three lessons of the war in Afghanistan. First, U.S.
strategy should be aimed at creating security and stability through a
trusted government and a reliable national army. Second, U.S. strategy
should be focused on maintaining positive results through a robust
commitment to the local population. Finally, it should involve regional
players in a more proactive and constructive dialogue to create a stable
and secure regional environment that could lead to the security of
Afghanistan.
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